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Corporations-1962 Tennessee Survey
Daniel J. Gifford*
I. JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONs-THE SOLICITATION PLUS RULE
II. CORPORATE PROMOTIONS
III. INTERPRETATION OF CONDITIONAL AGREEMENT TO REDUCE SALARIES-
BALANCE SHEET VS. INCOME STATEMENT APPROACH
I. JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-
Tim SOLICITATION PLUS RULE
The extent of Tennessee's assertion of jurisdiction over foreign
corporations was considered in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v.
Oritz' and Fisher v. Trion, Inc.2 by two of the Tennessee courts of
appeal. Both cases are of interest because of their respective ap-
proaches to the so-called "solicitation plus" rule.
In the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Oritz case, the Court of
Appeals for the Western Section upheld the assertion of jurisdiction
over a foreign railroad corporation by service under Tennessee Code
Annotated section 20-2183 at the office of its "soliciting agent."4 That
case involved an alleged failure to deliver cotton shipped by the
plaintiff over the defendant railroad from Cruces, New Mexico, which
was destined for Houston, Texas. The plaintiff asserted claims based
*Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. 361 S.W.2d 113 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962), cert. denied, Oct. 4, 1962.
2. 353 S.W.2d 406 (Tenn. App. E. S. 1961), cert. denied, Dec. 8, 1961. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee also decided two cases in-
volving jurisdiction over foreign corporations: Smith v. Lancer Pools Corp., 200 F. Supp.
199 (E. D. Tenn. 1962), and First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F.
Supp. 730 (E. D. Tenn. 1962). These cases are treated in Cheatham, Conflict of
Laws-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. REv. 646, 647 (1963).
3. Service at office of corporation.-When a corporation, business trust, or any
person has an officer or agency, or resident director, in any county other than that
in which the chief officer or principal resides, the service of process may be made on
any agent or clerk employed therein in all actions brought in such county against
same growing out of the business of, or connected with, said principal's business; but
this section shall apply only to cases where the suit is brought in such counties in
which such agency, resident director, or office is located." TENN. CODE ANr. § 20-218
(1956).
A foreign corporation may be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Tennessee courts
by service effected under § 20-218 whether or not the cause of action sued upon
arose out of the business conducted by such corporation in Tennessee. See Alwood
& Greene v. Buffalo Hardwood Lumber Co., 152 Tenn. 554, 560, 279 S.W. 795, 797
(1925). Cf. J. W. Hull Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Grand Lodge, 10 Tenn. App.
356, 361-62 (W.S. 1929).
4. 361 S.W.2d at 118.
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on contract, the Carmack amendment and negligence. 5
The defendant railroad had no tracks in Tennessee, but it operated
an office in Memphis staffed by two of its employees, a "soliciting
agent" and a clerk. The court found that the defendant, through such
employees, had authority to issue and had issued "exchange bills of
lading" and had gathered information and communicated with poten-
tial freight or passenger traffic over the defendant's lines. The court
also found that the defendants "execute contracts" in Memphis, but
it failed to specify what kind of contracts or how many of such
contracts have been executed.
6
The jurisdictional question before the court was posed by the
defendant's plea in abatement which attacked service of process
upon it on the basis of the fourteenth amendment and the commerce
clause. A demurrer to the plea was sustained; after judgment was
awarded to the plaintiff, the defendant appealed, inter alia, on the
basis of the plea in abatement.
7
In order to reach the constitutional question posed by the plea,
the court had an initial task of statutory construction. In construing
section 20-218, the court approved the interpretation which had been
adopted in Ketch v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. 8 by the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. In that case, the court
interpreted the statutory term "office ' 9 as including an office main-
tained by a railroad soliciting agent and held that the only impedi-
ment that might arise with respect to service upon a foreign
corporation maintaining such an office would be a constitutional one. 10
In Tucker v. International Salt Co.," however, the Tennessee Supreme
Court, employing a rationale that appeared to be constitutionally
5. Id. at 114. It would appear that the defendant could have challenged the
adjudication in Tennessee of a suit based upon the Carmack Amendment. See 24 Stat.
386 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1958).
6. The facts are recited in 361 S.W.2d at 118. The court's failure to specify the
kind of contracts found to be executed in finding No. 1 raises an inference that such
contracts are the exchange bills of lading found to have been executed in finding No. 3.
Compare the court's further reference to the execution of contracts in 361 S.W.2d
at 122-23, and the court's admission, id. at 125, that the facts were "practically
similar" to those in Green v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 205 U.S. 530 (1907).
7. 361 S.W.2d at 115.
8. 51 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Tenn. 1953); accord, Turcott v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 101
Tenn. 102, 45 S.W. 1067 (1898). But cf. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Richardson, 121
Tenn. 448, 457 in which "offices at Nashville, soliciting freight" were held not to make
foreign railroad corporations amenable to Tennessee jurisdiction. The Richardson
case may be distinguishable, however, because service was on "traveling soliciting
agents" and reliance was solely under the predecessor of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-220 to
-221.
9. Although the statute uses the term "officer," such term has been interpreted to
mean "office." Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Turner, 88 Tenn. 266, 267, 12 S.W.
544 (1889); Chicago & A.R.R. v. Walker, 77 Tenn. 475, 479 (1882); Toppins v.
E.T., Va. & Ga. R.R., 73 Tenn. 600, 604 (1880).
10. 51 F. Supp. at 245.
11. 209 Tenn. 95, 349 S.W.2d 541 (1961).
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based,12 assumed that section 20-217,13 a companion jurisdictional
section to section 20-218, could not subject a foreign corporation to
the jurisdiction of the Tennessee courts unless such corporation was
"doing business" 14 in Tennessee; the court held that the satisfaction of
the doing business requirement would be tested by the "solicitation
12. See id. at 544-45. See Morgan & Handler, Procedure and Evidence-1961
Tennessee Survey (II), 15 VAND. L. REv. 921, 934-35 (1962).
13. "Service on corporate officers.-Service on the president or other head of a
corporation, or, in his absence, on the cashier, treasurer, or secretary, or, in the
absence of such officers, on any director of such corporation, shall be sufficient. If
the action is commenced in the county in which the corporation keeps its chief office,
the process may be served on any one of the foregoing officers, in the absence of those
named before him. If neither the president, cashier, treasurer, or secretary resides
within the state, service on the chief agent of the corporation, residing at the time
in the county where the action is brought, shall be sufficient." TENN. CODE AN,. §
20-217 (1956).
Although the Tucker court was concerned with § 20-220 as well as with § 20-217, the
language of the opinion indicates that the court considered § 20-220 for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the implied doing business requirement in § 20-217,
see note 14 infra, could be met by satisfying the § 20-220 doing business definition.
See 209 Tenn. at 99-100, 349 S.W.2d at 543.
14. It would appear that the litigants, as well as the court, assumed the existence
of a "doing business" requirement. See 209 Tenn. at 99, 349 S.W.2d at 543. The
court used "presence" interchangeably with "doing business." 209 Tenn. at 102-05, 349
S.W.2d at 544-45.
In interpreting the predecessors of §§ 20-217, 20-218, Tennessee decisions prior to the
Tucker case had indicated that such provisions applied to foreign corporations which
were "doing business" in Tennessee. See, e.g., J. W. Hull Plumbing & Heating Co.
v. Grand Lodge, 10 Tenn. App. 356, 361-62 (W.S. 1930); Chicago & A.R.R. v.
Walker, 77 Tenn. 475, 478-79 (1882); Alwood & Greene v. Buffalo Hardwood Lum-
ber Co., 152 Tenn. 544, 551, 279 S.W. 795, 797 (1925). Cf. Wrought Iron Range
Co. v. D. W. DeVault, 6 Tenn. App. 513, 520-21 (E.S. 1922) (construing predecessor
of § 20-218 and commingling interpretation of "office" with "doing business"). It is
interesting to note that the "doing business" condition which surrounded the juris-
dictional question was found not only in now obsolescent United States Supreme Court
opinions construing the fourteenth amendment, e.g., International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 583 (1914), and in state court jurisdictional decisions, but
also after 1891 had a possible statutory reference. Chapter 122 of the Acts of 1891
provided that every foreign corporation "which may desire to do any kind of business
in this State" in order to "carry on business" in Tennessee had to qualify and upon
qualification was declared to be "subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State
just as though it were created under the laws of this State." Chapter 81 of the Acts
of 1895 amended the Act of 1891 to require qualification before a foreign corporation
should "do business, or attempt to do business, in this State" and provided that upon
qualification such corporation would be "subject to the jurisdiction of this State as
fully as if created under the laws of the State of Tennessee." As applied subsequent to
1891 to corporations which had qualified, therefore, the predecessors of §§ 20-217 and
20-218, provided a method of serving corporations which were already subject to the
jurisdiction of the Tennessee courts under the Acts of 1891 or 1895; a similar analysis
might possibly have been applied to corporations which were obligated to qualify but had
not done so. Cf. Radford v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 128 F. Supp. 775 (E.D.
Tenn. 1955). Although it is unclear whether chapter 13 of the Acts of the Extra Session
of 1929 (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 48-901 to -912) repealed by implication all of the pro-
visions of the Acts of 1891 and 1895 quoted above, cf. Crenshaw v. Texakola Pecan
Shellers, Inc., 171 Tenn. 273, 280, 102 S.W.2d 60, 63 (1937), a reading of §§ 20-217
and -218 which would relate them to present qualification provisions might restrict
the reach of the former sections over unqualified corporations to causes of action
1963]
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plus" rule.15 While it is far from clear whether the Oritz court viewed
Tucker as a case interpreting the fourteenth amendment or as a case
of statutory construction, there are some indications in the Oritz
opinion that it chose to interpret Tucker as a case of statutory con-
struction only.16 In any event, by taking note 7 of the language in
Tucker which adverted 8 to an erosion of the solicitation plus rule,19
the Oritz court interpreted Tucker as doing no more, from the stand-
point of either constitutional interpretation or statutory construction,
than requiring the application of an eroded form of that rule.
20
arising out of business done in Tennessee. See TEN. CODE ANN. § 48-923 (Supp.
1962).
15. 209 Tenn. at 101-05, 349 S.W.2d at 543-45. The "solicitation plus" rule was a
test for measuring the scope of a state's assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion. If the foreign corporation was engaged only in solicitation within a state, the
foreign corporation was not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of that state. If the
foreign corporation engaged in activities in addition to "mere solicitation," however,
then it could be subjected to that state's jurisdiction. See Morgan & Handler, Pro-
,cedure and Evidence-1961 Tennessee Survey (11), 15 VA'ND. L. REv. 921, 934-35
(1962). Cf. the reference in United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 807-08
(1948) to "hair-splitting legal technicalities" which had emerged under the solicitation
-plus rule. The rule has been used both as a fourteenth amendment measure of state
court jurisdiction and as a state-law measure of jurisdiction.
16. The court described Tucker as a case which "discusses the meaning and ap-
polication to the facts as stated there of our T.C.A. § 20-217 and T.C.A. § 20-220
. ... 361 S.W.2d at 121, and further noted that International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), referred to in the Tucker opinion, "had a different ques-
tion," i.e., a fourteenth amendment question, "from the case of Tucker v. International
Salt Company." 361 S.W.2d at 123.
17. 361 S.W.2d at 122.
18. 209 Tenn. at 105, 349 S.W.2d at 545.
19. See Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1943) which con-
tains Justice Rutledge's now classic description of the erosion of the solicitation plus
rule.
20. As applied to railroad solicitation offices, the solicitation plus rule has never been
very strong. Continuous negotiations with respect to settlement of claims of shippers
had been held sufficient activity to constitute the "plus" that would validate the
assertion of jurisdiction at an early date, even though it would appear that in the
case so holding none of the persons attached to the office involved had any authority
to settle claims other than through persuasion. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227
U.S. 218, 228 (1913); accord, Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921).
Since many of the railroad solicitation offices which have been involved in litigation
have engaged in at least this amount of "plus" activity, jurisdiction has often been
upheld. Canadian Pac. Ry. v. Sullivan, 126 F.2d 433, 438 (1st Cir. 1942); Moore v.
Atlantic Coast Line, 98 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Pa. 1951). Cf. Willett v. Union Pac. R.R.,
76 F. Supp. 903 (N.D. Ohio 1948). Compare Wadell v. Green Textile Associates,
Inc., 92 F. Supp. 738 (D. Mass. 1950); Isenberg v. Atlantic Coast Line, 82 F. Supp.
927 (D. Mass. 1949). See also note 29 infra. But see Kelley v. Delaware, L. &
W.R.R., 170 F.2d 195 (1st Cir. 1948); Smith v. Louisville & N.R.R., 90 F. Supp. 189
(S.D.N.Y. 1950); Fiorella v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 89 F. Supp. 850 (E.D. Pa. 1950);
Goldstein v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 93 F. Supp. 671 (W.D.N.Y. 1950); Zuber v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 82 F. Supp. 670, 675 (N.D. Ga. 1949); Doyle v. So. Pac. Ry., 87
F. Supp. 974 (E.D. Mo. 1949); Murray v. Great N. Ry., 67 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa.
1946); Worthy v. Louisville & N.R.R., 79 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 276
App. Div. 1068, 96 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1950). The basis on which the foregoing decisions
interpreted the solicitation plus rule varied. In some cases the rule was applied as a
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It distinguished Tucker on its facts:21 it said that the instant case
involved a fixed office, a secretary attached to such office, and an
agent attached to the office who possessed the power to contract
for his principal, such factors apparently constituting the "plus"
elements required under Tucker to sustain jurisdiction. In dealing
with Green v. Chicago, Baltimore & Quincy Ry., the leading au-
thority with respect to the solicitation plus rule, the court admitted
that the facts in the instant case were "practically similar"23 to the
facts in Green, but suggested that the Green case had undergone
substantial erosion in the years subsequent to its promulgation. The
court held that even if Green were relevant to the interpretation of
section 20-21824 or to the fourteenth amendment, 5 however, the instant
case was distinguishable from Green because of the fact that Mem-
phis, the city in which the solicitation office was located, is situated
near a large water and rail terminal.26 The court concluded that
because a large amount of the freight carried by water to Memphis is
reshipped by rail to all parts of the nation, it was "good business
judgment" 27 for the defendant to maintain an office in Memphis.
The court's distinction seems weak inasmuch as it is not immediately
apparent how much more strategic a location the Memphis water and
rail terminal is than the Philadelphia water and rail terminal was
at which the soliciting office involved in the Green case was located.2
Moreover, it would seem that if the board of directors of any railroad
corporation has been performing its functions properly, each solicita-
tion office established by that railroad will have been established
with "good business judgment." The courts distinction would thus
seem to be less of a distinction of Green than of an illustration of
the erosion of the solicitation plus rule. As a precedent, Oritz might
have spoken with greater clarity if it had either expressly rejected
Green in the railroad solicitation context,. or if, in its use of the
matter of state law; in other cases the rule was applied as a fourteenth amendment
limitation on the scope of state court jurisdiction; in other cases the rule was applied
as a measure of the extent of federal service of process.
21. 361 S.W.2d at 122.
22. 205 U.S. 530 (1907).
23. 361 S.W.2d at 125.
24. The court noted that Green was concerned with "the rule governing doing
business within the [federal court] district" and indicated that Green might be
relevant if such rule "is the same as that required by our state statute." Ibid.
25. The court also dealt with Green from a constitutional standpoint. 361 S.W.2d
at 125.
26. Id. at 126-27.
27. Id. at 127.
28. 205 U.S. at 532. Philadelphia is an important port, the headquarters of the
Pennsylvania Railroad, and the seat of large terminal facilities maintained by the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Reading Railroad.
29. Cf. the following cases dealing with railroad solicitation offices, which, in
varying legal contexts, contain language indicative of the abandonment of the
19631
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strategic location factor, it had caused a factual inquiry to be made
with respect to how strategic the Memphis location is in dollar
amounts of goods being shipped through Memphis and the dollar
amounts of such goods that ultimately find their way to the defend-
ant's railway.
Other parts of the Oritz opinion relating to jurisdiction are un-
satisfactory. The court's handling of International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington,0 McGee v. International Salt Co.,3 and Napelbaum v. Atlantic
Greyhound Corp.3 2 left much to be desired. Moreover, the court's
failure' to cite any cases in support of its decision against the com-
merce clause contention of the defendant is not conducive to im-
parting an understanding of the legal basis for the court's ruling.
Whether the Oritz result is a good one is open to doubt. The
opinion is a praiseworthy attempt to limit the Tennessee Supreme
Court's endorsement of the solicitation plus rule in the Tucker case.
The lack of reported facts concerning the defendant's economic and
solicitation plus rule: Edwards v. Atlanta & W.P.R.R., 197 F. Supp. 686 (E.D.N.Y.
1961); Perkins v. Louisville & N.R.R., 94 F. Supp. 946, 951 (S.D. Cal. 1951). Cf.
Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954);
Allegue v. Gulf & S.A.S.S. Co., 103 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Kendrick v. Sea-
board A.L.R.R., 98 F. Supp. 372, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
30. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The court appeared content to explain the International
Shoe case as involving a fourteenth amendment question and therefore "a different
question" from the question before the Tennessee Supreme Court in Tucker v.
International Salt Co., 361 S.W.2d at 123. Although a fourteenth amendment ques-
tion was before the Oritz court, that court did not cite the International Shoe case in
support of its decision on the constitutional issue, except as citations of International
Shoe appear in excerpts from other cases quoted by the court.
31. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). Although the court thought that McGee supported its
decision on the constitutional issue, it failed to point out that McGee involved a
cause of action arising from activities of the defendant which were connected with the
forum state. This distinction would seem to take much force out of the court's
rhetorical question, 361 S.W.2d at 124.
32. 171 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). The court quoted a lengthy excerpt from
the Napelbaum opinion in which the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York suggested a number of criteria which it said should be considered
in deciding questions of jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Despite the fact that
the third, fourth and fifth criteria proposed in the Napelbaum opinion were, respective-
ly, whether the defendant's activities in the forum gave rise to the cause of action,
whether the forum has some special interest in granting relief, and the relative con-
veniences of the parties, the court stated that in applying the five criteria to the
activities of the defendants "we still can hardly see how the defendant can escape
submitting to the jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Tennessee." 361 S.W.2d
at 126. Since the third Napelbaum criterion points away from the assertion of juris-
diction, and the non-residency of both plaintiffs and defendants would seem to
cause the fourth and fifth criteria also to point against such assertion, it would seem
that in reaching the result that it did, the court should have rejected the Napelbaum
opinion.
33. In describing the defendants' contentions, the court cited the three cases relied
upon by the defendants, all of which tended to support the defendants' contention of
lack of jurisdiction: Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932); Mich.




other connections with Tennessee makes it hard to evaluate the
fairness of subjecting the foreign railroad corporation to the juris-
diction of the Tennessee courts in an action unconnected with the
activities of its Tennessee soliciting office, especially when the non-
residency of the plaintiffs seemingly evidences a lack of special in-
terest by Tennessee in the prosecution of the suit. As a result it is
hard to determine both the compatability of the result with fourteenth
amendment due process limitations4 and the wisdom of the result as
evidencing a construction of section 20-218.- Although some United
States Supreme Court decisions would indicate that the defendant's
commerce clause contention had much merit to it, 36 those decisions
all predate International Shoe v. Washington and evidence a sub-
stantial degree of conceptual rigidity;37 it may be that the flexible due
process standards which have developed as a result of the latter case
are similarly to be applied in interpretation of the commerce clause. 3
The Trion case dealt with Tennessee Code Annotated sections
20-2203 and 20-22140 which subject foreign corporations to the
34. Fourteenth amendment limitations on state assertions of jurisdiction would appear
to be described primarily in terms of fairness. See International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The fairness of subjecting a foreign corporation to suit
in a state court would seem to be related to the nexus between the corporation and
the state asserting jurisdiction over it. The economic components of that nexus, ac-
cordingly, would seem highly relevant to an evaluation of the constitutional validity of
the asserted jurisdiction.
35. In addition to the notions of fairness which should probably be read into the
state jurisdictional statutes, it would seem that, in the interest of the state, restrictions
on the exercise of jurisdiction should be read into such statutes to the extent necessary
to prevent foreign corporations from being discouraged from establishing or maintaining
economic ties with Tennessee. Compare National Beverage Co. v. W.J. Bush & Co., 6
Tenn. Civ. App. 643, 654 (1916). If the courts are not to overcompensate for the
discouragement factor, however, an inquiry into the kind and degree of relationship
maintained by a foreign corporation with Tennessee would be revelant. Thus no
purpose would be served in exempting from Tennessee jurisdiction a foreign corpora-
tion which maintains such profitable economic ties with Tennessee that it would be in
such corporation's interest to continue to maintain and to expand those ties whether
or not such an exemption were granted.
36. See cases cited note 33 supra and International Milling Co. v. Columbia, 292
U.S. 511 (1934), all of which place substantial emphasis on the plaintiff's residence.
But cf. Wadell v. Green Textile Associates, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 738 (D. Mass. 1950).
37. The Supreme Court's tests of whether an undue burden on interstate com-
merce existed centered around the domicile or residence of the plaintiff, the business
operations of the defendant, and the place where the cause of action arose. The Court
expressly refused to consider questions of inconvenience or availability of witnesses,
and did not inquire into the extent of the burden imposed on commerce in terms
of dollar amounts. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Terte, supra note 33, at 287-88.
38. Compare Developments in the Law-State-Court jurisdiction, 73 H.A.v. L. REv.
909, 985-86 (1960).
39. "Foreign corporations subject to actions.-Any corporation claiming existence
under the laws of the United States or any other state, or of any country foreign to
the United States, or any business trust found doing business in this state, shall be
subject to suit here to the same extent that corporations of this state are, by the laws
thereof liable to be sued, so far as relates to any transaction had, in whole or in part,
within this state, or any cause of action arising here, but not otherwise. Any such
19631
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jurisdiction of the Tennessee courts "so far as relates to any trans-
action had, in whole or in part, within this state, or any cause of
action arising here" and authorize service "upon any agent of said
corporation.., no matter what character of agent such person may
be." Section 20-220 contains an express "doing business" requirement
and its own apparently non-exclusive definition of doing business. The
section 20-220 doing business requirement is met with respect to
a corporation which has "any transaction with persons, or ...any
transaction concerning any property situated in this state, through any
agency whatever, acting for it within the state."
The defendant in Trion, a foreign corporation, produced air clean-
ing equipment, which it sold in Tennessee through manufacturer's
agents or brokers.41 When one of the plaintiffs inquired by letter to
the defendant about certain equipment produced by it, the defendant
replied that it would ask its local manufacturer's representative to
assist with the equipment and suggested to its representative that the
latter purchase such equipment for resale to the plaintiff.4 The
representative contacted the plaintiffs, received an order for the
equipment, purchased the equipment from the defendant and resold
it to the plaintiffs. When the equipment caught fire the plaintiffs sued
the manufacturer.43
On such facts the court of appeals indicated that the defendant had
not done business in Tennessee apart from the broad section 20-220
corporation or trust having any transaction with persons, or having any transaction
concerning any property situated in this state, through any agency whatever, acting
for it within the state, shall be held to be doing business here within the meaning of
this section." TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-220 (1956).
40. "Service on foreign corporations.-Process may be served upon any agent of said
corporation or trust found within the county where the suit is brought, no matter
what character of agent such person may be; and, in the absence of such an agent, it
shall be sufficient to serve the process upon any person, if found within the county
where the suit is brought, who represented the corporation at the time the transaction
out of which the suit arises took place, or, if the agency through which the transaction
was had, be itself a corporation or business trust, then upon any agent of that cor-
poration or trust upon whom process might have been served if it were the de-
fendant. The officer serving the process shall state the facts, upon whom served, etc.,
in his return; and service of process so made shall be as effectual as if a corporation
of this state were sued, and the process has been served as required by law; but, in
order that defendant corporation or trust may also have effectual notice, it shall be
the duty of the clerk immediately to mail a copy of the process to the home office of
the corporation or trust, by registered return-receipt letter, the postage and fees for
which shall be taxed as other costs. The clerk shall file with the papers in the cause a
certificate of the fact of such mailing, including the receipt for such letter if one,
and make a minute thereof upon the docket, and no judgment shall be taken in the
case until thirty (30) days after the date of such mailing." TENN. CoDE ANN. §
20-221 (1956).
41. 353 S.W.2d at 408.
42. Id. at 409.




definition of doing business.' In deciding whether the defendant had
done business within the meaning of that section's definition, the
court used the term "agency" in section 20-220 and the term "agent"
in section 20-221 interchangeably. 45 It concluded that since the trans-
action with the plaintiffs was effected by a sale from the defendant to
its representative followed by a resale to the plaintiffs, the representa-
tive sold for its own account; since the representative "was not [the
defendant's] agent, either actual or apparent, for the transaction with
the plaintiffs" the defendant could not be subjected to suit in Ten-
nessee by service on its representative.
Although section 20-220, through its doing business definition,47
provides for the exercise of jurisdiction over any foreign corporation
with respect to a cause of action arising from a single transaction with
persons, or concerning property, in Tennessee, in order that such
corporation fall within this single transaction provision, the trans-
action, at least in part, must have been "through any agency what-
ever, acting for it within the state." The agency qualification made
it difficult for the court in the instant case to find that the defendant
had fulfilled the terms of the definition, since a purchase for resale
44. The court appeared to be dealing with the doing business question apart from
the § 20-220 doing business definition when it cited and quoted from two A.L.R.
annotations on the subject of doing business and cited Banks Grocery Co. v. Kelley
Clarke Co., 146 Tenn. 579, 243 S.W. 879 (1922), although the latter case construed
the phrase "doing business" in the context of the predecessor of § 20-220. The court's
citation of Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 128 Tenn. 417, 161 S.W. 488 (1913);
Lummus Cotton Gin Co. v. Arnold, 151 Tenn. 540, 269 S.W. 706 (1925); and Bouldin
v. Taylor, 152 Tenn. 97, 275 S.W. 340 (1925) appears to evidence the court's feeling
that the "doing business' standard relevant to an assertion of jurisdiction under the
service of process provisions of the Tennessee Code is the same as the standard under
the qualification of foreign corporations provisions. Compare note 14 supra. But of.
State v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 106 Tenn. 282, 294, 61 S.W. 75, 77 (1901).
45. 353 S.W.2d at 408-09. Compare the language from the opinion quoted in
note 46 infra, with the court's description of the plaintiff's contention, "that Rogers
was the agent of the defendant Trion, Inc., for the transaction with Fisher and that
the service of process in this case was therefore valid." 353 S.W.2d at 408. (emphasis
is the court's.) In both instances the court's language contains an inference that the
terms "agency" and "agent" as used in §§ 20-220 and 20-221 have the same meaning.
The cases, however, would indicate that it is harder to fulfill the § 20-220 "agency"
than to fulfill the section 20-221 "agent." Such a difference would be expectable,
since § 20-221 merely designates the proper person to receive service of 'process on
behalf of corporations which § 20-220 has already made subject to the jurisdiction of
the Tennessee courts.
46. "Having concluded ...that the defendant, Trion, Inc., was not doing business
within this state within the meaning of T.C.A. § 20-220 at the time of the sale of its
equipment to the plaintiffs, and that Rogers was not its agent, either actual or ap-
parent, for the transaction with the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial
court properly sustained the defendant's plea in abatement to the service of process."
353 S.W.2d at 409.
47. "Any such corporation or trust having any transaction with persons, or having
any transaction concerning any property situated in this state, through any agency
whatever, acting for it within the state, shall be held to be doing business here
within the meaning of this section." TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-220 (1956).
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does not fit the common law conception of an agent or agency.48
Fulfillment of the doing business requirement other than through
the doing business definition might have been possible, however, if
the court had felt free to re-evaluate the meaning of the doing busi-
ness requirement and to restate it in terms of an interest analysis.
49
Although the recent assumption by the Tennessee Supreme Court in
Tucker v. International Salt Co.50 that section 20-217 could not sub-
ject a foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of the Tennessee courts
unless that corporation were "doing business" in Tennessee and the
Tucker holding that such "doing business" requirement was to be
measured in terms of the "solicitation plus" rule5' would have hind-
ered the instant court from making such a revaluation, the Tucker
case appears to have applied the doing business and solicitation plus
requirements under an assumed constitutional compulsion.52 Since
the instant case involved a cause of action more closely related to the
defendant's nexus with Tennessee than did the Tucker cause of action
as presented to the Tennessee Supreme Court on stipulation,5 3 the
constitutionality of subjecting the defendant in the present case to
the jurisdiction of the Tennessee courts is less open to doubt.5
The absence of any citations of United States Supreme Court
opinions in the Trion case may indicate that Trion was based upon
considerations of local policy.55 The absence of any discussion in the
48. Although the existing case law is opposed to such an interpretation, National
Beverage Co. v. W. J. Bush & Co., 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 643, 653-54 (1916); but cf.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Richardson, 121 Tenn. 448, 458 (1908), a re-evalua-
tion of the meaning of the term "agency" in the light of current jurisdictional
concepts might cause a court to conclude that such term included a soliciting agent.
Under such a construction of the term, the defendant in the instant case would have
been liable under § 20-220 if it had made the sale directly to the plaintiffs, with
the intervention of the representative in the capacity of a soliciting agent.
The interpretation of the § 20-220 term "agency' as including a soliciting agent
would appear to have some support in the history of that section. The provisions of
§§ 20-220 and 20-221 were adopted in 1887 as a response to Chicago & A.R.R. v.
Walker, 77 Tenn. 475 (1882) which had held that a traveling soliciting agent was not
an agent within the meaning of "agent" as used in the predecessor of § 20-218. In the
Walker case, the plaintiff sued for breach of an agreement reached with the defendant's
soliciting agent with respect to traveling accommodations on the defendant's railroad,
which was entirely without the state. Although the defendant had purchased a ticket on
that railroad within Tennessee, he purchased it from a local railroad office rather than
from the soliciting agent. Such history would indicate that a soliciting agent is an
"agent" within the § 20-221 service of process provisions and that possibly such an
agent would be an agency within the meaning of the § 20-220 doing business definition.
49. Morgan & Handler, Procedure and Evidence-1961 Tennessee Survey (II), 15
VA~N. L. R1Ev. 921, 935 (1962).
50. 209 Tenn. 95, 349 S.W.2d 541 (1961).
51. See notes 14, 15 supra and accompanying text.
52. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
53. 209 Tenn. at 100, 349 S.W.2d at 541.
54. See Cheatham, Conflict of Laws-1961 Tennessee Survey (II), 15 VAND. L. REv.
843, 844 (1962). See also Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73
HARv. L. REv. 909, 928-30 (1960).
55. Cf. Morgan & Handler, supra note 48, at 935 n.51 where the suggestion is made
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opinion, however, of such considerations makes the present decision
an unsatisfactory one. In a case like Trion in which Tennessee would
appear to have an obvious interest in facilitating the adjudication of
a claim of two of its residents with respect to harm which occurred
in Tennessee,5 the principal factors militating against the assertion
of jurisdiction would be the hardships imposed upon the foreign
corporation in defending away from home and the perhaps more far
reaching result that such a decision would entail, the increase in the
number of suits brought against such corporation by ultimate pur-
chasers of its products whose burden in bringing suit would be eased
by such a decision. Since part of such hardships will be economic,
it would appear that an examination of the dollar amounts of the
defendant corporation's products sold in Tennessee, the amounts of
such corporation's profits derived from Tennessee sources and the
financial impact that subjecting such corporation to the jurisdiction of
the Tennessee courts in this and other like cases would have upon it
would be relevant in assessing the extent of that hardship.5 7
II. CORPORATE PROMOTIONS
Community General Hospital, Inc. v. Diehl-8 involved an unsuccess-
ful promotion of a hospital corporation. A preferred stockholder had
brought a class action 9 in the Chancery Court of Shelby County
for the appointment of a receiver to carry out the dissolution of the
corporation and for the cancellation of common stock which the
directors had issued to themselves. The chancellor granted both
requests; on appeal from his decision cancelling the common stock,60
the Court of Appeals for the Western Section affirmed. The bases of
the decision were, first, that the issuance of the stock constituted a
breach of a fiduciary duty owed by the directors to the preferred
stockholders, 61 second, that the representations in the prospectus had
deceived the preferred stockholders into believing that the directors
that the failure of the Tucker court to cite Banks Grocery Co. v. Kelley-Clarke Co.,
146 Tenn. 579, 243 S.W. 879 (1922), a leading Tennessee case applying the
"solicitation plus" rule, strengthens the probability that the Tucker court applied that
rule on the basis of federal constitutional considerations rather than on the basis of
state policy. The Trion court cited Banks and did not cite United States Supreme
Court opinions.
56. But cf. Denson v. Webb, 23 Tenn. App. 599, 136 S.W.2d 59 (W.S. 1938).
57. See note 35 supra. Compare Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act
§ 1.03(a) (4).
58. 360 S.W.2d 935 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
59. See note 78 infra.
60. The appointment of a receiver was not appealed. However, the court indicated
that its decision with respect to the cancellation order would determine the validity
of the receiver's appointment. 360 S.W.2d at 939-40.
61. Id. at 951.
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would not be issued such stock for their own benefit,62 and third,
that there had been a failure of the consideration for which the stock
was issued.
63
The corporate charter provided for 348,000 shares of $10 par value
preferred stock (the funds from the sale of which, together with funds
to be borrowed, were to constitute the basic source of the project's
financing) plus 1,200,000 shares of $.01 par value common stock.
The common stock apparently possessed exclusive voting rights
except during periods in which default had been made in the payment
of preferred dividends, at which times the voting power was to be
shared between the common and the preferred; even during such
periods, however, the common shares would continue to possess the
power of control if the number of outstanding shares of common
was greater than that of outstanding preferred.64
At their initial meeting, the incorporators unanimously resolved
that the common stock be subscribed at par by the directors, who
would in turn pay for such stock "'in their services in promoting the
Corporation, planning and aiding in the sale of the stock.... "65 Such
resolution provided, however, that the stock "'should not be issued
to the subscribers until the completion or abandonment of the pro-
motion.'6" The incorporators also resolved that the directors, by
majority vote, could use "'so much of the common stock as might be
advisable"' in promotion, bonuses for salesmen, and other purposes in
connection with the promotion and with commencing business opera-
tionsY7 Three of a total of four formal prospectuses issued by the
directors contained statements68 to the effect that (i) the directors
had subscribed for all the common shares at par and had agreed
among themselves to use "said stock" in promotion and sale of the
preferred shares and for other promotional and incentive purposes,
and (ii) "'the limit of expenses of promotion is $1.5069 per unit and
62. Id. at 951-52.
63. Id. at 953.
64. Id. at 945.
65. Id. at 944.
66. Ibid. The resolution also provided that the directors should be reimbursed after
the promotion period for expenses advanced by them and that "'a continuation of the
promotion be a condition of participation in the stock subscription." 360 S.W.2d at
944-45.
67. Id. at 944.
68. The statements were contained in prospectuses dated February 1, 1958, March
1, 1958, and July 1, 1958. Such statements were as follows: "The Directors subscribed
for all the common shares, at par, and have agreed among themselves to use said
stock in promotion and sale of the preferred shares, sales incentives for salesmen, ob-
taining key men in promotion and as incentive awards to obtain key personnel in
operating the hospital. .. . The limit of expenses of promotion is $1.50 per unit. No
officer or agent shall receive any salary during the promotion except within the
expense allowed and provided above."' Id. at 941.
69. The chancellor found that the prospectus statement referred to a promotion
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that no officer or agent shall receive any salary or compensation dur-
ing the promotion except within the expense allowed.'"-o At a date
when the directors apparently were still attempting to promote the
sale of the preferred stock but on which date the court found that the
promotion "'was then dead and incapable of resurrection,"'71 the
directors resolved to issue fifty-six per cent of the common stock of
the corporation to themselves. It was apparently admitted that such
shares were issued "for services rendered and to be rendered the
corporation"; 2 the directors' resolution indicated that these "services"
were promotional in nature.73 Subsequently, the stockholders voted to
discontinue the sale of the corporation's stock and to sell the cor-
porate property for the highest price obtainable;74 the proceeds ap-
parently were intended for either a distribution in liquidation or the
construction of a hospital smaller than that which had originally been
planned.75
In referring to "a breach [by the directors] of their 'fiduciary duty'
owing to the persons who had purchased preferred stock in this
corporate entity,"76 the court did not make clear the precise duty to
which it referred, although it would appear that the court felt the
breach of duty consisted of the directors' issuance of the common
stock to themselves beneficially without the knowledge or consent of
the preferred stockholders. 7 The court's references to "deception"78
expense limitation of $1.20 per unit. Id. at 945. The court of appeals gave no ex-
planation for the discrepancy.
70. Id. at 941.
71. Id. at 946.
72. Id. at 940.
73. Id. at 947.
74. Id. at 948.
75. Id. at 939, 946.
76. Id. at 951.
77. Ibid. Directors and promoters are considered to be under a fiduciary duty to
their corporation not to issue stock to themselves for inadequate consideration without
the consent of all of the other stockholders. Cf. Old Dominion Copper Mining &
Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909).
78. 360 S.W.2d at 942, 951. The manner in which the court utilized the term
"deception" in its opinion would indicate that it was not suggesting that the defendants
were guilty of common law deceit. The court seems expressly to have found an
absence of scienter. Id. at 942. Moreover, the first reference to deception was stated
in terms of a possibility of deception. Ibid. Finally, it is unclear from the opinion how
those preferred stockholders who purchased their stock in the period from the com-
mencement of the preferred stock sale on November 5, 1956, id. at 945, until February
1, 1958, the date of the first prospectus, id. at 941, could be deceived by representa-
tions in such prospectus. Although the chancellor made reference to "'other available
informative matter,"' id. at 947, the court of appeals referred only to the prospectuses
when speaking of deception or possible deception. Although the broad anti-fraud pro-
visions of the Tennessee Securities Law, TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1644(B) (1956),
might have been of assistance in supporting a cause of action for deception falling short
of the requirements of common law deceit, the failure of the defendants' conduct to
amount to deceit and the court's omission to refer to § 48-1644(B) suggest that the
references to deception should be interpreted as suggested in text. The interpretation
19631
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
appear to be related to this breach of duty, since the lack of knowledge
of the preferred stockholders may have partially resulted from the
use in three prospectuses of misleading language concerning the plans
of the directors with respect to the issuance of common stock. One
difficulty with the court's approach, however, lies in the fact that it is
not easy to pinpoint the manner in which the director's action injured
the preferred stockholders. Because the claim of the preferred stock-
holders to earnings was both prior and limited, the issuance of the
common stock by the directors to themselves could not have diluted
the earnings equity of the preferred stockholders.79 Similarly, the
issuance of the common stock could not have jeopardized the preferred
stockholders' prior right to receive, on liquidation, all of the corpora-
tion's assets up to the ceiling of the preferred's liquidation claim; and
with regard to assets in excess of such ceiling, the preferred stock-
holders were unconcerned. 0 Since the chancellor found that "'one
share of common stock . . .went with the sale of each share of
preferred stock to the public," 8' it is possible that the court per-
mitted the preferred stockholders to sue because their equities
as common stockholders had been diluted by the directors' action.82
The court's silence on this point suggests that the matter was not
considered. If the breach of duty was not related to the dilu-
tion of the common stock equities but consisted of a shrinkage
in the cushion of common capital83 to which the holders of preferred
were entitled, clarity would have been served by the courts enuncia-
tion of such fact.M The court's reference to "a breach of fiduciary
suggested in text would also avoid certain problems which might arise in a class action
based on misrepresentations. Cf. 3 MooRs, FEDmAL PRACTICE ff 2,3.10[5] (1948).
79. Cf. Jeffs v. Utah Power & Light Co., 136 Me. 454, 470, 12 A.2d 592, 600
(1940): "The preferred stockholders . . .had no interest in the share of the corporate
assets of those holding securities junior to theirs, nor in the earnings which might
accrue over and above the amount necessary to satisfy the dividends on the preferred
stock.. . .A plaintiff, who can show no injury to himself ...surely has no standing
in court"; Berle, Compensation of Bankers and Promoters Through Stock Profits, 42
HARv. L.-Rl-v. 748, 749 (1929). Although both the Maine court and Berle were con-
cerned with preferred stockholders who became such subsequent to the issuance of
the common stock by promoters to themselves, the fact that in the instant case the
common was issued subsequent to the dates on which the preferred stockholders
became such does not seem to make the issuance any more injurious to the preferred
stockholders.
80. See note 79 supra.
81. 360 S.W.2d at 945.
82. See Jeffs v. Utah Power & Light Co., supra note 79, at 470-71, 12 A.2d at 600.
83. Cf. BALLAN , CoRpoRAnoNs 841-42 (1946). The fact that the par value of
the common capital was limited to a total of $12,000 would detract from the im-
portance of a cushion in the amount of such par value, however.
84. Regardless of the degree of injury to them, the standing of the preferred stock-
holders to force cancellation of the common stock issued by the directors to themselves




duties" in the same sentence0 in which it stated that there had been
"no consideration"86 for the issuance of such stock, however, may
indicate that the court was concerned with a lack of common cushion
and that the failure to secure assets, which would form such a
cushion, in return for the common stock constituted, in the absence
of the preferred's consent, a violation of the duty owed by the
directors to the preferred stockholders. The court's conclusion that no
consideration had been paid for the common stock issued to the
directors was based on its finding that the purported payment for
such stock consisted of services which had not been fully performed
at the date of the stock issuance.
8 7
The chancellor had based his decision cancelling the stock partly
on a failure of consideration theory. He stated that since the con-
sideration for the issuance of the common stock to the directors was
past and future services in promoting the corporation, the failure of
the promotion had rendered such services worthless and consequently
destroyed the consideration for the shares. 88 In affirming this aspect
of the chancellor's decision, the court of appeals construed 89 that
decision to have held that future services were improper consideration
for the issuance of stock under section 48-204 of the Tennessee Code
Annotated. ° Under either the reasoning of the chancellor or of the
85. 360 S.W.2d at 952. Part of such sentence is quoted in text at note 91 infra.
86. Ibid. The court's statement that "no consideration" existed cannot mean that
all of the services rendered as payment for the common stock were valueless, since the
court was willing to see one of the promoter-directors compensated (out of liquidation
proceeds in excess of creditor and preferred stockholder claims) for legal services
rendered in attempted payment for such stock. 360 S.W.2d at 955. As applied to
legal services, the court's statement must mean that such services could not constitute
consideration for purposes of § 48-204, because all of the legal services had not been
rendered as of the date of the stock issuance, or, disregarding the dictum quoted in
text, because all of such services had not been rendered as of the date of issuance and
could not be rendered thereafter because of the failure of the promotion.
It is interesting to note that the court was willing to treat legal services differently
from other promotional services. Thus, with respect to the non-legal promotional
services the court seemingly adopted the view of the chancellor that such services
were valueless to the corporation because the promotion had failed; but it took a
different view with respect to legal services, despite the fact that these were apparently
rendered as incidental to the promotion and upon the promotion's failure became
worthless to the corporation. If the value of the services to the corporation in
furthering its purposes is the relevant value, then it would appear that the value of
both legal promotional services and other promotional services would be worthless,
viewed in retrospect, after the failure of the promotion; but, viewed at the dates of
rendition, cf. Pipelife Corp. v. Bedford, 150 A.2d 319, 321 (Del. Ch. 1959), their
value would be measured by the probabilities on such dates of the success of the
promotion. Cf. RESTATEMENT, REsTTiON § 155, comment d (1937).
87. 360 S.W.2d at 953.
88. Id. at 947.
89. Id. at 952.
90. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-204 (1956): "Shares of stock shall be issued only for
money, or for other property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, or for
labor or services actually received by, or conveyed or rendered to, the corporation for
its use and lawful purposes, or in its possession as surplus."
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court of appeals, the directors would have injured the preferred stock-
holders by failing to obtain a cushion of common capital in return
for the issuance of the common stock.
In dictum, however, the court of appeals went somewhat further.
Referring to "a breach of fiduciary duties," the court said that "it
appearing that there had been no consideration for the issuance of
this common stock to these directors, it could have been cancelled
upon a proper procedure ... even if the corporation had continued
and succeeded actually in the completion of the purpose for which it
was organized."91 This dictum seems unnecessarily broad, since if the
corporation had succeeded in the completion of the purpose for
which it was organized, the promotional services would necessarily
have been fully rendered, albeit subsequent to the date of issuance
of the stock. Since the statutory requirement of "labor or services
actually received"92 was apparently designed to insure that a corpora-
tion receive full par value for its stock, stock issued in violation of the
statutory command should be defective only while the consideration
remains unpaid. If and when it is subsequently paid, the defective,
nature of such stock ought to be cured.93
Another dictum of the court deserves some mention. The court
stated that the corporation would be foreclosed from building a hos-
pital smaller than the one described in the prospectus because "it
would have been in direct violation of the description given to the
public with respect to what would be built."9 Against the defendants'
argument that the powers of the corporation could not be limited
by prospectus representations, the court noted that few purchasers of
stock analyze the corporate charter but most such purchasers do read
and rely upon statements contained in the prospectus.95 Moreover,
every contract or application of estoppel restricts the exercise of cor-
91. 360 S.W.2d at 952.
92. Note 90 supra.
93. See Scully v. Automobile Fin. Co., 12 Del. Ch. 174, 179, 109 AtI. 49, 51 (1920):
"[Flull paid, non-assessable shares of stock . . . can be issued only for 'labor done,'
i.e., after it has been done. This does not mean that shares may not be issued for
services to be rendered so long as they are not marked fully paid until that condition
has been fulfilled by rendering the service." See also Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731,
739 (Del. 1960): "While a contract to purchase stock to be paid for in the future
will not withstand contemporaneous attack in the courts, nevertheless, lapse of time
and subsequent performance by the purchaser of all or part of the contemplated
services will validate the purchase and will supply consideration for such portion of
the contracted-for stock as is reasonably related to the value of the services performed."
But cf. Taylor v. Citizens' Oil Co., 182 Ky. 350, 361-62, 206 S.W. 644, 649-50 (1918);
Maclary v. Pleasant Hills, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 39, 109 A.2d 830 (Ch. 1954); Sec-
tion 48-206 of the Tennessee Code, which authorizes the issuance of stock which
is not fully paid for, on the condition that the corporate charter provide for such
issuance, does not compel a contrary conclusion.




porate powers. While there is a danger of destroying business flexi-
bility in holding a business bound to every prospectus representation
of planned future conduct, a departure from the instant prospectus
representations which concerned the size of the proposed hospital
would have basically altered the nature of the preferred stockholders'
investment. While an investor in a going business can learn some
objectively verifiable facts about the enterprise in which he is invest-
ing, an investor in an enterprise in the promotion stage is peculiarly
dependent upon prospectus representations for information about
such enterprise.
III. INTERPRETATION OF CONDITIONAL AGREEMENT To REDUCE
SALARIES-BALANCE SHEET VS. INCOME STATEMENT APPROACH
Tennessee Products & Chemical Corp. v. United States96 was a
suit for refund of federal income taxes which dealt with the inter-
pretation of a condition attached to an obligation of a corporate
officer to repay to the corporation withdrawals in excess of his salary.
In 1931 the plaintiff corporation was experiencing an unprofitable
period. In order to improve the financial condition of the corporation,
the officers of the corporation agreed that the president should have
the power to reduce their salaries on the condition that such reduc-
tions in salary would be restored to them "when business returned
to where it was as good as when" the reductions were effected.97 It
was also agreed that although the salary of the chairman of the board
would be reduced, the chairman nevertheless could continue to with-
draw amounts equal to but not in excess of his ureduced salary and
that the "overdrafts," i.e., withdrawals in excess of the reduced salary,
should constitute a debt owed by him to the corporation. Such debt
was to be extinguished, however, on the occurrence of the above-
mentioned condition, i.e., "when business returned to where it was as
good as when" the reduction was effected.9 8
Subsequent to the agreement reducing salaries, the corporation was
reorganized under former section 77B99 of the Bankruptcy Act. The
chairman did not prove any aspect of the foregoing transaction in the
reorganization proceedings; however, the debt owed by the chairman
to the corporation was carried as an asset in the reorganization pro-
ceedings, apparently without cognizance having been taken of a
possibility that the debt might be extinguished through operation of
96. 199 F. Supp. 885 (M.D. Tenn. 1961), aff'd, 297 F.2d 529 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962).
97. 199 F. Supp. at 888.
98. Ibid.
99. 48 Stat. 911 (1934) (now Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, § 1, 52 Stat. 883
(1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1958)).
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the contingency.00 While the corporation was still being operated
under the orders of the federal court pursuant to the reorganization
proceedings, the chairman died, leaving an insolvent estate. The cor-
poration asserted in Tennessee chancery court insolvency pro-
ceedings a claim for repayment of the excess withdrawals, which
was allowed in full by the chancery court.1 1 In 1942 the corporation
attempted to write off as a bad debt loss in its federal income tax
return for that year the balance of the debt owed to it by the chair-
man. In a suit for refund of income taxes paid, the District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee held that the debt was not
properly a bad debt loss for 1942 because prior to that time, in 1940,
"good business conditions" had resumed and accordingly the debt
had been extinguished by the terms of the condition attached to it.
02
The court described the transaction between the chairman and the
corporation in terms of a debt owed by the chairman to the corpora-
tion subject to extinguishment upon the occurrence of a condition
subsequent.10 3 It rejected the suggestion'" advanced by counsel for
the corporation that the condition subsequent should be treated as an
obligation of the corporation which had to be proven by the Chair-
man's estate in the reorganization proceedings 0 5
In construing the phrase "good business conditions," the court
attributed an income statement meaning rather than a balance sheet
meaning to that phrase and equated it with the earning of some
amount of current corporate income. 10 In so doing the court was
100. 199 F. Supp. at 893.
101. Id. at 893-94.
102. Id. at 894.
103. Id. at 893.
104. Ibid.
105. Under the view of corporate counsel the condition extinguishing the debt would
apparently be viewed as an obligation of the corporation which besides being proved
would have to be evaluated in the reorganization proceedings. Under such a view
the value of such a condition subsequent might depend upon whether the probabilities
of the occurrence of good business conditions were assessed with respect to the
reorganized corporation or the unreorganized corporation. Compare In re Ray Long
& Richard R. Smith, Inc., 95 F.2d 525, 528 (2d Cir. 1938) (assuming that a claim
based upon the value of corporate stock would have to be determined, if at all, with
respect to stock of the unreorganized corporation) with Thompson v. England, 226
F.2d 488, 490 (9th Cir. 1955), where with respect to a loan repayment obligation
contingent upon the business achieving "a sound, financial condition" the court stated
that such contingency would have to be assessed with respect to a post-bankruptcy
business; elsewhere in its opinion, however, the court dealt with the contingency as ap-
plicable only to the non-post-bankruptcy business. See note 112 infra.
106. Although the court noted that "the resumption of good business is defined in
the agreement of March 16, 1931, to be when business returns to where it was as
good as when each executive or individual's salary was cut," 199 F. Supp. at 888,
such definition does not itself indicate whether an income statement or a balance
sheet is to be used as a measure of good business conditions. Although the court did
not expressly interpret the "good business conditions" phrase, it said that "there appears
to be no doubt that good business conditions were resumed by the corporation in
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supported by the fact that in reducing the salaries of the corporate
officers, the parties' concern appeared to be with whether the cor-
porate income would be "in black" or "in red."10 7 The court was not
entirely consistent in its approach, however, since it elsewhere de-
scribed the contingency in terms of a balance sheet approach; thus it
equated the return of "good business conditions" with the resumption
of the corporation's "former condition of financial soundness."108
Under an income statement interpretation of the "good business
conditions" phrase, the extinguishment of the chairman's debt would
not take place unless it could be offset against current income; 0 9
extinguishing the debt when it could be so offset would not aggravate
the position of corporate creditors," 0 although the debt might not
remain as a corporate asset until the corporation's net asset position
was restored to its amount as of the date of the salary reduc-
1940 for the first time .... ." Id. at 894. Since the court found that the corporation
incurred losses for the years 1936 through 1939, and earned $254,131.45 for the year
1940, id. at 890, it would seem that the court equated current earnings, at least in
some amount, with good business conditions.
A reading of the "good business conditions" phrase on a pure income statement
basis raises some problems, however. If good business conditions mean current in-
come in an amount not less than the amount of current income at the date of the
salary reductions, accumulations of those reductions over a period of time might
require extinguishment of the chairman's debt and repayment of such reductions to
the other officers at a time when current income was insufficient to offset such
extinguishment and repayments. Furthermore, if the discretionary power to cut salaries
were exercised with respect to an officer during a period in which the corporation
incurred a loss, the foregoing approach would require reimbursement of accumulated
reductions at a time when the corporation had reduced its current loss to an amount
not in excess of the loss incurred when the reduction went into effect, even though
the corporation had never earned current income subsequent to such reduction and
its financial condition was accordingly substantially worse than at the date of such
reduction.
The foregoing considerations may indicate that if the parties intended an income
statement reading of the good business conditions phrase, they may also have intended
that the reimbursements of the salary reductions should take place only to the extent
that such reimbursements could be offset against current income. Even an income
statement interpretation of the contingency which would maintain the debt until its
extinguishment could be offset against current income might have to be modified with
some balance sheet factors in order to prevent an extinguishment of the debt in a
situation in which the corporation was earning substantial current income but had
liabilities in excess of its assets. Cf. Booth v. Booth & Bayliss Commercial School, Inc.,
120 Conn. 221, 226, 180 Ad. 278, 280 (1935).
107. 199 F. Supp. at 887. See id. at 888. The court did not inquire in detail into
the motivation of the contingent salary reductions. Some possible grounds might consist
of a desire to lessen a drop in the market price of the corporation's stock, to maximize
working capital, to minimize a fall in the corporation's credit position, and to assist
against the incurrence of bankruptcy. The latter two grounds would carry some
inference that the postponement and contingent nature of the reimbursement were
designed to benefit corporate creditors.
108. 199 F. Supp. at 893.
109. See note 106 supra.
110. With respect to the relationship of the contingency to corporate creditors
under an income statement analysis of such contingency, see note 106 supra.
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ions."' Under a balance sheet approach, however, the debt
would in effect remain an asset for the benefit of corporate creditors
during the interval in which the net assets of the corporation had
shrunk below their amount on the date of the salary reductions,
2
The court viewed the occurrence of the reorganization to be ir-
relevant to the interpretation of the "good business conditions"
contingency, which would extinguish the chairman's debt, even
though it conceded that the occurrence of good business conditions
may have been possible only because of the reorganization." 3 Even
on an income statement interpretation of the contingency, the parties
may have intended to maintain the debt for the benefit of creditors
until it could be extinguished without aggravation of the creditors'
position." 4 If the reorganization was an insolvency reorganization-
which the opinion indicates that it was" 5-the subsequent extinguish-
ment of the debt might have conflicted with such intention, since
111. See note 106 supra.
112. A balance sheet approach would be tantamount to subordinating the chair-
man's claim to reimbursement to the claims of the corporation's other creditors. In
the case of the other officers whose claims for reimbursement were in the form of
claims for cash rather than in the form of a condition subsequent extinguishing an
indebtedness, the subordination of the reimbursement claim would perhaps most clearly
appear. Cf. Thompson v. England, 226 F.2d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 1955), in which the
court reached the subordination result with respect to a loan repayment obligation
conditioned on the debtor's business achieving "a sound, financial condition" when the
court stated that it was dealing with "a contract in which the condition precedent to
liability . . . the bankruptcy makes certain never to arise." Cf. In re Philip A. Singer
& Brother, Inc., 114 F.2d 813, 814 (3d Cir. 1940): "the salaries of the debtor's em-
ployees were cut in half with a moral obligation upon the debtor's part to restore such
cuts if the future state of the business warranted it. The debtor's business got worse
instead of better; the debtor sought relief in a court of bankruptcy; and the moral
obligation ceased to exist." But cf. Royal Tiger Mines Co. v. Ahearn, 97 Colo. 116,
47 P.2d 692, 696 (1935), holding with respect to a business whose obligation to repay
a debt was contingent upon such payment being "convenient" that unfavorable pros-
pects for future profitable operation would mature the repayment obligation and
permit the creditor to whom such contingent obligation was owed to share in the
assets of the debtor proportionately with other creditors; since the debtor was
stipulated to have possessed assets in excess of liabilities, however, the subordination
issue was not presented.
Under the above analysis, similar treatment of the chairman's claim for reimburse-
ment of salary reductions would result whether the obligations of the corporation to
the chairman and of the chairman to the corporation were deemed to be separate as
suggested by corporate counsel or "inextricably interwoven," as determined by the
court, 199 F. Supp. at 893. Under the separate obligation view, the claim of the chair-
man to reimbursement would be evaluated at the time of the reorganization proceed-
ings, and if the contingency were read in balance sheet terms, the court should
probably construe the contingency as in effect making the chairman's claim subordinate
to the claims of other creditors. Under the "inextricably interwoven" reading of the
obligations adopted by the court a balance sheet reading of the contingency would
preserve the chairman's debt for the benefit of corporate creditors at least during a
period of insolvency.
113. 199 F. Supp. at 894.
114. See note 106 supra.
115. 199 F. Supp. at 893.
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at the time at which the creditors were paid in the reorganization pro-
ceedings a debt owed to the corporation by a solvent debtor could
neither have been eliminated nor reduced in amount without aggra-
vating the creditors' position. Since the possibility of subsequent
extinguishment would reduce the value of such a debt as of the date
of the reorganization proceedings, such possibility might accordingly
have been foreclosed by an insolvency reorganization. Although the
insolvency of the Chairman's estate occurred prior to the completion
of the reorganization proceedings and substantially reduced the value
of the chairman's debt, the occurrence of a reorganization in which
creditors were not fully compensated ought to have had the effect
of eliminating the possibility of subsequent extinguishment of that
debt in order that whatever value remained in such debt might serve
to compensate such creditors. On a balance sheet interpretation of
the contingency, under which the chairman's debt would remain as
an asset for the benefit of creditors, an insolvency reorganization
would seem to foreclose the possibility of a subsequent extinguish-
ment of such debt for similar reasons.
